Introduction

In the present chapter, I investigate the theme of the lion's roar. After surveying occurrences of lion's roars in the Pāli Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas, I examine more closely the lion's roar attributed to the Buddha in the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta, based on a translation and study of its Ekottarika-āgama counterpart.

The lion's roar is a recurrent motif in the discourses collected in the four main Pāli Nikāyas and their counterparts in the Chinese Āgamas. Most of these instances are related to the Buddha or his disciples, although at times those outside of the Buddhist dispensation attempt a lion's roar, which usually miscarries.

An example for such unsuccessful lion's roars can be found in the Pāṭika-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya and its Dīrgha-āgama parallel, which report how the naked ascetic Pāṭikaputta, after making a public announcement of his impending defeat of the Buddha in a contest of magical powers, failed to show up at the gathering where this contest was to take place. Even after repeatedly being invited to come, he is depicted as still unable to face the Buddha. The messenger sent to fetch him comes to the conclusion that Pāṭikaputta's earlier proclamation was not a genuine lion's roar, but instead was comparable to a jackal trying to imitate a lion.[n.1] DN 24 at DN III 24,17 and DĀ 15 at T I 69a5; cf. also SHT IV 32 folio 17 R4f, Sander and Waldschmidt 1980: 120, and for a study of this episode Anālayo 2015a: 23 and 2016e. Another claim to defeat the Buddha, which also ends unsuccessfully (although in this case the debater did face and discuss with the Buddha), is according to EĀ 37.10 at T II 716a26 a lion's roar, although the parallel versions MN 35 at MN I 233,24 and SĀ 110 at T II 36b16 do not consider this instance to be a lion's roar.

A similar judgement was passed on the wanderer Sarabha, who after disrobing as a Buddhist monk had declared in public that he had left the Buddha's dispensation, having reached realization in regard to the teachings of the Buddha. When invited by the Buddha in front of a congregation of wanderers to specify what he had realized, Sarabha was unable to reply. His companions thereupon compare his inability to substantiate his earlier claim to a jackal trying to roar like a lion.[n.2] AN 3.64 at AN I 187,35, SĀ 970 at T II 250c5, and SĀ² 204 at T II 450a20; cf. also folio 169b, Pischel 1904: 817.

These two instances bring out a central nuance of the image of a lion's roar, in that one should be able to substantiate such a proclamation in a debate.[n.3] Manné 1996: 32 explains that lion's roars are "utterances which the speaker is willing to defend in public", in line with "the Vedic tradition of challenges in debate". Additional detail about what makes up a true lion's roar can be gathered from the Kassapasīhanāda-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya and its parallels, which depict various possible criticisms of a lion's roar. These are that someone roars a lion's roar in an empty place, instead of amidst the assemblies, or that the roar is made without real self-confidence.[n.4] [3] DN 8 at DN I 175,1 and DĀ 25 at T I 104b3; cf. also SHT VI 1296, Bechert and Wille 1989: 70, and fragments Hoernle 149/Add. 98 R6–8 and Pelliot bleu 340 R6–9, Hartmann 1991: 151f. DN 25 at DN III 57,19 concludes an occasion where the Buddha confronts the allegation that he might be afraid of facing assemblies with the remark that, by rejecting such insinuations, the Buddha had roared a lion's roar; such a qualification is not made in the parallel versions DĀ 8 at T I 49b22, T 11 at T I 224b22, and MĀ 104 at T I 595c7. A lion's roar fails to command respect not only if one is unable to defend the claim one has made, as illustrated in the examples above, but also if one is not able to satisfy and inspire others with one's explanations.

A number of discourses show that the basis for the Buddha's self-confidence when making a lion's roar was in particular his possession of the ten powers and the four intrepidities of a Tathāgata.[n.5] [4] The ten powers feature as the grounds for the Buddha's lion's roar in, e.g., AN 10.21 at AN V 33,7, AN 10.22 at AN V 37,6, SĀ 348 at T II 98a14, SĀ 684 at T II 186c16, SĀ 701 at T II 189a8 (cf. also SĀ 702 and SĀ 703), EĀ 46.4 at T II 776b15, T 780 at T XVII 717c14, T 781 at T XVII 718c18, and T 802 at T XVII 747b13 (with a different power at T XVII 747c17); cf. also the short statements in SĀ 1227 at T II 335c5, SĀ2 54 at T II 392b18, and EĀ 51.3 at T II 816c8. AN 6.64 at AN III 417,13 then lists six powers as the basis for the Buddha's lion's roar, as do SĀ 686 at T II 187b28 and SĀ 687 at T II 187c14. According to Endo 1997/2002: 20, the development of the notion of ten powers "seems to have had an intermediate phase where only six powers of the Buddha are mentioned". A set of five powers, again as the basis for the Buddha's lion's roar, occurs in AN 5.11 at AN III 9,15. For Sanskrit fragments relevant to the ten powers cf., e.g., Lévi 1910: 443f, de La Vallée Poussin 1911: 1063f, Waldschmidt 1932: 209–225, Waldschmidt 1958, Sander 1987: 181–192, SHT VI 1220R and SHT VI 1457R, Bechert and Wille 1989: 15 and 143, SHT IX 2018, SHT IX 2066, and SHT IX 2162, Bechert and Wille 2004: 41, 82 and 119, and Chung 2009. The four intrepidities occur on their own as the grounds for the Buddha's lion's roar in AN 4.8 at AN II 9,3 and EĀ 27.6 at T II 645b28 (with a different intrepidity at T II 645c7). Only three intrepidities occur in the case of the above quoted AN 3.64 at AN I 186,33. Sanskrit fragments referring to the four intrepidities are, e.g., SHT IV 623 folio 5, Sander and Waldschmidt 1980: 252, SHT VI 1504, Bechert and Wille 1989: 166, and SHT IX 2323, Bechert and Wille 2004: 173. The close relationship of these qualities to the Buddha's lion-like nature becomes particularly evident in a Sanskrit fragment of a Daśabala-sūtra, which has a drawing of a winged lion after each of the Buddha's powers.[n.6] [5] Table I in Waldschmidt 1958: 386f.

In the Mahāsīhanāda-sutta a listing of the ten powers and four intrepidities occurs as part of a lion's roar made in reply to a wrong allegation by the former Buddhist monk Sunakkhatta,[n.7] [6] MN 12 at MN I 69,31, with a counterpart in T 757 at T XVII 592c2. somewhat similar in nature to the above discussed instance of the ex-monk Sarabha. Such occurrences further underline the significance of the lion's roar in a debate.

The nuance of a challenge in debate does not exhaust the implications of the image of a lion's roar. Several discourses that relate the Buddha's lion's roar to his possession of the ten powers and four intrepidities indicate that the content of his lion's roar is a teaching on the impermanent nature of the five aggregates of clinging.[n.8] [7] SN 12.21 at SN II 28,1, SN 12.22 at SN II 28,17, and EĀ 46.3 at T II 776a21. The delivery of such a lion's roar instils fear in others, especially among devas who are of long life, as it makes them realize that even their existence is bound to come to an end.[n.9] [8] SN 22.78 at SN III 85,20 and AN 4.33 at AN II 33,21 (here the teaching delivered is on the nature of personality, sakkāya, its arising, its cessation, and the path to its cessation). In these contexts, the lion's roar stands for a revelation of truth in general.[n.10] [9] The close relationship of the lion's roar to proclaiming a truth is reflected in MĀ 137 at T I 645b22, paralleling a passage on the nature of the Tathāgata as one who speaks the truth in AN 4.23 at AN II 24,2, which exemplifies the truthfulness of the words of a Tathāgata with his roaring a lion's roar before any assembly. Although the lion's roar is thus in a way also a proclamation of truth, it does not seem to share the magical potency often associated with public asseverations of truth, on which cf. also, e.g., Burlingame 1917, Hopkins 1932: 317–323, Lüders 1959: 487–505, Brown 1968, Wayman 1968, and Harvey 1993: 67–79. Such teachings are lion's roars because they instil fear, similar to the fear experienced by other animals when they hear the roar of a lion.[n.11] Heim 2003: 546 notes that "the Tathāgata delivering his teaching … in exactly the same way that a lion's roar causes brutes of the forest to quake in fear … suggests that some fear is valuable, in that it can replace complacency with urgency".

This salutary aspect of the lion's roar is relevant to situations that go beyond facing an opponent in debate. Instead, here the lion's roar stands for a teaching strategy whose purpose is to stir up a sense of urgency and thereby lead others towards liberation.[n.12] According to Brekke 1999: 450, "the function of the Buddha in the simile of the lion is to create fear through his teaching … and when this fear is effectively translated into religious motivation one will strive to attain nirvāṇa." This complements the image of the lion's roar in early Buddhist discourse which, besides the defensive function of meeting a challenge in a debate, also has the positive function of promoting the progress of a disciple on the path to awakening.

The lion imagery in a teaching context receives additional explanation in a discourse in the Aṅguttara-nikāya, according to which a lion, after having roared its lion's roar, sets out hunting in a careful manner. Similarly the Tathāgata, on roaring the lion's roar of his teachings, does so in a careful manner.[n.13] [10] AN 5.99 at AN III 122,8: sakkaccaṃ yeva tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti. A rather extended teaching by the Buddha in DN 26 at DN III 79,5 receives the title "a lion's roar discourse on the wheel-turning king", Cakkavatti-sīhanāda-sutta in the PTS edition, although Be, Ce, and Se only have the title Cakkavatti-sutta. The imagery of a lion is in fact recurrently associated with the Buddha, and besides the nuances of royalty and carefulness also conveys a sense of aloofness and independence.[n.14] [11] Cf. e.g. Sn 107,5: durāsadā hi te bhagavanto sīhā va, according to which those like the Buddha are difficult to approach like lions. Brekke 1999: 448 comments that the nuances underlying this image are that a "lion … is aloof, separate and completely detached". According to SN 48.51 at SN V 227,14, a lion is reckoned foremost among animals due to its superior strength, speed, and courage. These qualities make the lion an obvious choice as a symbol of royalty and supremacy; in fact Bareau 1960: 248 notes that a range of Vinayas present the motif of a lion as the most prominent image to be used for adorning Buddhist stūpas. A famous example of the use of this motif is the lion capital from Sārnāth; cf. below p. 649 (already published in Huntington 1985: 47 fig. 4.5). This capital features four addorsed lions with open jaws, as if just about to roar a lion's roar, standing on a drum adorned with a wheel right beneath their forefeet; cf. also Bareau 1960: 248, Irwin 1973: 716, Pandey 1978: 27, and Deeg 2003: 42. This pillar was apparently still witnessed in situ by Xuánzàng (玄奘); cf. T 2087 at T LI 905b23, translated in Beal 1884: 46. For a form of representation with the lion in the middle of the wheel cf. Zin 2015: 56. Bareau 1971b: 17 explains that, although the lion was "not only rare in India but most likely unknown in the middle basin of the Ganges where Buddha spent all his life, this animal plays an important role in Indian symbolism … the lion symbolizes royalty." The same image also plays a role in the Jain tradition, where the lion was the animal chosen to represent Mahāvīra; cf. Schubring 1962/2000: 24. Deo 1956: 560 notes instances where other Jains, because of their skill at debating, are also acclaimed as lions; on the lion's roar as an epithet of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa cf. Verardi 2011: 221. As a symbol of kingship, supremacy, etc., the lion is of course a recurrent motif in many cultures.

Although the lion imagery is thus closely related to the Buddha, lion's roars can also be made by a disciple.[n.15] [12] The ability to roar a lion's roar is explicitly associated with all arahants in SN 22.76 at SN III 84,4 and its parallel MĀ 120 at T I 610a5. SĀ 1101 at T II 289c24 relates the ability of disciples to proclaim a lion's roar to their insight into the four noble truths (cf. also SĀ2 97 at T II 408b16, although in this case the lion's roar on the four noble truths is made by the Tathāgata). In SĀ 911 at T II 228c10 and SĀ2 126 at T II 421c20 a lay disciple's proclamation before a king, made to dispel the rumour that Buddhist monks are allowed to accept gold or silver, is also qualified as a lion's roar; the same is the case when Anāthapiṇḍika defeats the views held by other wanderers in SĀ 968 at T II 249a24 and SĀ2 202 at T II 448c27; or when he makes a proclamation before the Buddha in SĀ 1241 at T II 340a25. EĀ 17.1 at T II 582a9 even speaks of a lion's roar when Rāhula asks the Buddha about how to practise mindfulness of breathing. According to the listing of eminent disciples in AN 1.14.1 at AN I 23,24, Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja was foremost among monks who roar a lion's roar. The listing of eminent disciples in EĀ 4.3 at T II 557b19 reckons him instead foremost in defeating outsiders. For a study of tales related to Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja cf., e.g., Lévi and Chavannes 1916: 205–275, Ray 1994: 151–162, and Strong 1979. Examples are a monk and on another occasion a nun, who indicate that they intend to announce their attainment of the final goal in front of the Buddha as their lion's roar.[n.16] [13] Th 175 and Thī 332. However, not all declarations of having attained the final goal are reckoned as lions' roars; cf. also Katz 1982/1989: 29–31.

The disciple most frequently associated with the image of the lion's roar appears to be Sāriputta. One of the lion's roars by Sāriputta is made in order to defend himself against a wrong allegation by another monk, who has raised the accusation that Sāriputta had slighted him.[n.17] [14] The qualification of his defence as a lion's roar occurs in AN 9.11 at AN IV 374,15, MĀ 24 at T I 452c17, and EĀ 37.6 at T II 712c23. Another instance occurs after Sāriputta has successfully answered a question by the Buddha, although at first he has been uncertain about how to reply to it. Once the Buddha has left, Sāriputta gives vent to his self-confidence by telling his companions that he felt ready to face any question the Buddha might want to ask him.[n.18] [15] SN 12.32 at SN II 55,26, fragment S 474 folio 18 R8, Tripāṭhī 1962: 55, MĀ 23 at T I 452b3, and SĀ 345 at T II 95c7. Notably, in both instances it is not Sāriputta himself but his companions who reckon his proclamations to be a lion's roar.[n.19] [16] A proclamation made by Mahākassapa in SĀ 1143 at T II 302c12 and SĀ2 118 at T II 417c7 is only qualified as a lion's roar by the reciters of the discourse.

Other lion's roars proclaimed by Sāriputta express his deep conviction that nobody, be it in the past or in the future, could surpass the Buddha in respect to being awakened.[n.20] [17] This proclamation is reckoned by the Buddha to be a lion's roar in DN 16 at DN II 82,8, DN 28 at DN III 99,12, SN 47.12 at SN V 159,11, DĀ 18 at T I 76c5, T 18 at T I 255a25, and SĀ 498 at T II 130c13. In EĀ 38.10 at T II 725b4 a proclamation by King Pasenadi regarding the faith-inspiring qualities of the Buddha and his disciples is also recognized as a lion's roar, although the qualification of being a lion's roar is not used in the parallel discourses MN 89 at MN II 124,24, AN 10.30 at AN V 69,24, and MĀ 213 at T I 797b16, nor in a parallel preserved in the Kṣudrakavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, T 1451 at T XXIV 238b21, with its Tibetan counterpart in D 6 tha 86a4 or Q 1035 de 82b8. The Buddha was quick to point out that this proclamation was made without actual knowledge of the qualities of other awakened ones in past and future times.

An instance where the Buddha teaches his disciples how to roar a lion's roar can be found in the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta and its parallels.[n.21] [18] MN 11 at MN I 63,24, MĀ 103 at T I 590b5, and EĀ 27.2 at T II 643c2. This seems to be the only instance where the Buddha actually formulates the contents of what his disciples should proclaim as their lion's roar in a situation of being challenged by contemporary wanderers and recluses.

The Ekottarika-āgama parallel to the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta presents this lion's roar with significant differences, which warrant a closer study of this particular case and its import for assessing the nature of a lion's roar in early Buddhist thought. In addition to the Ekottarika-āgama discourse, translated below,[n.22] [19] The translated discourse is EĀ 27.2 at T II 643c2 to 644b18. another parallel to the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta can be found in the Madhyama-āgama.[n.23] [20] MĀ 103 at T I 590b5 to 591b24.

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Translation

1. Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying at Sāvatthī in Jeta's Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika's Park.[n.24] [22] MN 11 at MN I 63,24 gives the same location, whereas MĀ 103 at T I 590b6 places the discourse at Kammāsadhamma in the Kuru country. At that time a group of many monks had entered Sāvatthī. Then the group of many monks had this reflection: "It is still too early in the morning for us to collect alms, let us approach the village of the heterodox wanderers for some discussion." [n.25] [23&24] Adopting the variant 論議 instead of 論義. The reference in EĀ 27.2 at T II 643c5 to a "village", 村, of these wanderers is unusual, and one would rather expect a reference to a park inhabited by them, 園, or to their place, 所. Then the group of many monks in turn approached the village of the heterodox [wanderers]. Having arrived, they exchanged greetings, and sat down to one side.[n.26] [25] Adopting a variant without 已在一面坐.

3. Then the wanderers asked the ⟨monks⟩:[n.27] [26] EĀ 27.2 at T II 643c7 here uses 道人, literally "men of the path", instead of the term 比丘 employed elsewhere in the discourse. "The recluse Gotama proclaims this teaching to his disciples: 'Monks, you should completely learn this teaching, entirely realize and understand it, and having realized and understood it, you should together receive it respectfully!'

"We also proclaim this teaching to our disciples: 'You should completely learn this teaching, entirely realize and understand it and, having realized and understood it, you should together receive it respectfully!' What is the difference between the recluse Gotama and us? What is there that is superior or inferior? That is to say, he proclaims teachings and we also proclaim teachings, he instructs and we also instruct."

When the group of many monks had heard this statement, they expressed neither agreement nor disagreement, but got up from their seats and left. Then this group of many monks said to each other: "We should go and report this matter to the Blessed One."

Then the group of many monks entered Sāvatthī to collect alms and, having eaten and put away their robes and bowls, with the sitting mat over their left shoulders, they approached the Blessed One. They paid respect with their heads at his feet and sat down to one side. Then the group of many monks fully reported what had happened to the Blessed One.[n.28] [27] The beginning part of MN 11 and MĀ 103 differs considerably; cf. the discussion below.

5. At that time the Blessed One told the monks: "If those heterodox wanderers pose such a question, you should employ this rejoinder to reply to them: 'Is there a single final goal or are there many final goals?' If those brahmins are capable of giving an unbiased answer,[n.29] [28] EĀ 27.2 at T II 643c22 here switches from the earlier 外道/異學 to 梵志, whereas the parallel versions MN 11 and MĀ 103 consistently refer to paribbājakas/異學 in this section. Such variation in translation terminology of what would probably have been a single term in the Indic original appears to be a regular trait of the Ekottarika-āgama; cf. also above p. 14f note 20. then they will answer like this: 'There is a single final goal, there are not many final goals.'

"[They should be asked]: 'As for that final goal, is the presence of sensual desire the final goal or is the absence of sensual desire the final goal?' [They will answer]: 'Regarding the final goal, the absence of sensual desire is to be regarded as the final goal.'

"[They should be asked]: 'How is that final goal, is the presence of ill-will the final goal or is the absence of ill-will the final goal?' [They will answer]: 'Regarding the final goal, the absence of ill-will is the final goal, the presence of ill-will is not the final goal.'

"[They should be asked]: 'How is it, is the presence of delusion the final goal or is the absence of delusion the final goal?' [They will answer]: 'Regarding the final goal, the absence of delusion is the final goal.'

"[They should be asked]: 'How is that final goal, is the presence of craving the final goal or is the absence of craving the final goal?' [They will answer]: 'Regarding the final goal, the absence of craving is the final goal.'

"[They should be asked]: 'How is that final goal, is the presence of clinging the final goal or is the absence of clinging the final goal?' [They will answer]: 'Regarding the final goal, the absence of clinging is the final goal.'[n.30] [29] In its series of enquiries, MĀ 103 at T I 590c16 presents craving and clinging together. MN 11 at MN I 65,1, however, agrees with EĀ 27.2 at T II 643c28 in treating these two as separate queries.

"[They should be asked]: 'How is that final goal, is it [to be attained] by one who is wise or by one who is not wise?' [They will answer]: 'Regarding the final goal, it is [to be attained] by one who is wise.'

"[They should be asked]: 'As for this final goal, is the final goal for one who is quarrelsome or is the final goal for one who is not quarrelsome?' They will answer:[n.31] In the original, EĀ 27.2 at T II 644a5, the phrase 彼當作是說 occurs in the middle of the reply, probably through an accidental shift of text. 'Regarding the final goal, that final goal is for one who is not quarrelsome.'[n.32] MN 11 at MN I 65,11 continues with another query not found in MĀ 103, whether the final goal is for one who enjoys and delights in conceptual proliferation, papañca. On the significance of papañca cf. the detailed study by Ñāṇananda 1971.

6. "Monks, there are these two views. What are the two views? That is, they are the view of existence and the view of non-existence.[n.33] MN 11 at MN I 65,17 and MĀ 103 at T I 591a8 note that those who hold one of these two views will oppose those who adopt the other view.

7. "Whatever recluse or brahmin who does not understand the origin and the result of these two views will consequently have a mind with sensual desire, a mind with ill-will, a mind with delusion, a mind with craving, and a mind with clinging, he will be one who lacks wisdom, he will be with a quarrelsome mind, and he will not take part in practice that is in conformity [with the final goal]. Such a person does not become liberated from birth, old age, disease, death, worry, dejection, pain, vexation, and from multifarious kinds of distress; he will not be liberated from dukkha.

8. "Whatever recluse or brahmin who understands [these two views] as they really are will not have delusion or ill-will in the mind and will continuously take part in practice that is in conformity [with the final goal]. [Such a person] will in turn attain liberation from birth, old age, disease, and death, I say, he now [cuts off] dukkha at its basic root.

"In this way, monks, there is this sublime teaching, which is reckoned an unbiased teaching. Whoever does not practice this unbiased teaching will succumb to five views.[n.34] EĀ 27.2 at T II 644a15: 五見. From the context it remains unclear what these "five views" refer to, nor is a similar statement found in the parallel versions. Judging from the Pañcattaya-sutta and its Tibetan counterpart, these could be the five views that affirm the survival of a percipient self after death, the survival of an impercipient self, the survival of a self that is neither-percipientnor-non-percipient, the annihilation of the self, and the advocating of Nirvāṇa here and now; cf. MN 102 at MN II 228,23 and Skilling 1994: 314,3, as well as a reference to this fivefold division in SHT IV 32 folio 1 V6, Sander and Waldschmidt 1980: 109, and in Vibh 378,16.

9. "Now I shall explain the four [types of] clinging. What are the four [types of] clinging? They are reckoned to be clinging to sensual desires, clinging to views, clinging to rules, and clinging to a self.[n.35] In regard to the fourth type of clinging, MN 11 at MN I 66,2 instead speaks of clinging to a doctrine of self, attavādupādāna. MĀ 103 at T I 591a22, however, agrees with EĀ 27.2 at T II 644a16 in reading 我受. The corresponding expression ātmopādāna can be found in fragment S 474 folio 12 R6, Tripāṭhī 1962: 43 (where the original apparently reads atmopādāna). For a discussion of the significance of this difference in regard to the formulation of the fourth type of clinging cf. Anālayo 2008d. These are reckoned to be the four [types of] clinging.

10. "If there are recluses or brahmins who thoroughly understand the notion of 'clinging to sensual desires', although they understand the notion of clinging to sensual desires, it does not follow that they therefore thoroughly discern the notions of all [types of] clinging. They begin by discerning the notion of clinging to sensual desires, but then they do not discern the notions of clinging to views, clinging to rules, and clinging to a self. The reason is that those recluses or brahmins are not able to discern the notions of these three types of clinging. This is the reason.

11. "If there are recluses or brahmins [who, in an attempt] to discern thoroughly all [types of] clinging, discern clinging to sensual desires and clinging to views, [yet] they do not discern clinging to rules and clinging to a self. The reason is that those recluses or brahmins are not able to discern these two [types of] clinging.

12. "If there are recluses or brahmins [who attempt] to be able to discern thoroughly all [types] of clinging, yet they are not endowed with [such ability], as they are [only] able to discern clinging to sensual desires, clinging to views, and clinging to rules, but they do not discern clinging to a self. The reason is that those recluses or brahmins are not able to discern clinging to a self. That is the reason why these recluses or brahmins as well, in spite of their [attempt] to discern thoroughly all [types of] clinging, are also not endowed with [such ability].

"These are reckoned the four [types of] clinging. What is their significance, what is their distinctive mark? The four [types of] clinging are reckoned to arise because of craving.[n.36] This short statement on craving as what underlies all four types of clinging is without a counterpart at this juncture in MN 11 and MĀ 103, which instead continue directly with the theme of the proper teacher and only turn to craving, etc., later, when EĀ 27.2 also comes back to this theme and takes it up in more detail; cf. §16.

13. "Like this, monks, this is a sublime teaching by properly discerning. If one does not practise [discerning] all of these [types of] clinging, one is not reckoned as unbiased. The reason is that the significance of the teachings is not easy to comprehend, not easy to understand, compared with the significance of what is not Dharma, what has not been proclaimed by a fully awakened Buddha.[n.37] MN 11 at MN I 66,32 and MĀ 103 at T I 591b3 differ in so far as they describe the inefficacy of placing confidence in a teacher who does not understand all four types of clinging. They thereby come back to a point made in their introductory sections, where the Buddha had taught four principles to the monks, the first of which is confidence in their teacher.

14. "Monks, you should know, the Tathāgata is thoroughly able to discern all [types of] clinging in their entirety. Because of being able to discern all [types of] clinging in their entirety and in conformity [with the Dharma], he is able to discern clinging to sensual desires, clinging to views, clinging to a self, and clinging to rules.[n.38] [39] Notably at this point the sequence has changed, with clinging to rules mentioned last. The reason is that the Tathāgata thoroughly discerns all [types of] clinging, in conformity with the Dharma, not in contradiction to it.

16. "Because of what do these four [types of] clinging arise? Thus these four [types of] clinging arise because of craving, because of craving they grow, and this clinging comes into operation.[n.39] [40] MN 11 at MN I 67,17 continues tracing the condition for the arising of clinging from craving via feeling, contact, the six sense-spheres, name-andform, consciousness, and formation to ignorance. MĀ 103 at T I 591b11 proceeds directly from clinging to ignorance, without mentioning any of the intervening links.

17. "One who in turn becomes unable to give rise to these [types of] clinging, due to not giving rise to these [types of] clinging, he is not afraid. Due to not being afraid, he in turn attains Nirvāṇa, knowing as it really is: 'Birth and death have been extinguished, the holy life has been established, what had to be done has been done, there is no further existence to be experienced.'

"Like this, monks, there is this sublime teaching. If one understands it according to reality, then one is endowed with all teachings, with the root of the practice of the teachings. The reason is because this teaching is superbly sublime, proclaimed by all Buddhas, it is devoid of deficiency in regard to any form of practice.[n.40] [42] This passage is without counterpart in the two parallel versions.

"Therefore, monks, [in such a teaching] there exists a firstgrade recluse, a second-grade recluse, a third-grade recluse, and a fourth-grade recluse. Beyond [these] there is no further recluse that is superior, that could surpass these. You can roar a lion's roar like this."[n.41] [43] MN 11 does not conclude with a lion's roar, which it only has at the beginning of the discourse; cf. MN I 64,1. MĀ 103 has its version of the lion's roar here and also at the beginning of the discourse, T I 590b10 and 591b23.

Having heard what the Buddha had said, the monks were delighted and received it respectfully.

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Study

A noteworthy difference between the Ekottarika-āgama version and its two counterparts manifests right away with the beginning of the discourse. The Majjhima-nikāya and Madhyama-āgama versions do not report an actual encounter between the monks and heterodox wanderers. Instead, according to them the Buddha delivered the present instruction to prepare the monks in case they should be challenged by heterodox wanderers.[n.42] [44] MN 11 at MN I 64,2 and MĀ 103 at T I 590b10. In these two versions, the challenge posed to the monks is only hypothetical, not an actual event.

The nature of the challenge also differs in the Majjhima-nikāya and Madhyama-āgama versions, as the imaginary heterodox wanderers query the claim made by the monks that only among them the four types of true recluse can be found, whereas other dispensations are devoid of these. On hearing this, and one might think quite reasonably, the heterodox wanderers question the basis for such a proclamation.

According to the Buddha's instruction, the monks should reply by proclaiming that the Buddha had taught them four principles as a basis for their proclamation. These four principles are:

• they have confidence in their teacher,
• they have confidence in their teaching,
• they are practising their moral obligations,
• they live in harmony with and feel affection for other disciples of the Buddha.[n.43] [45] In relation to the third principle, MĀ 103 at T I 590b21 adds that they also have confidence in regard to their moral obligations, 信戒德具足, something that, although not mentioned explicitly in MN 11 at MN I 64,13, would be to some degree implicit in the circumstance that they were willing to fulfil them.

On hearing this, and one might again think quite reasonably, the heterodox wanderers state that the same applies to them as well, in that they have confidence in their own teacher, etc. When faced with this reply, the monks should ask a series of questions about the nature of the final goal.

Compared with the Ekottarika-āgama account, this progression seems somewhat artificial. It would be beside the point to present confidence in one's own teacher, etc., as a ground for making a claim in a discussion with those who follow a different teacher. Instead of presenting such an argument, one would expect the Buddha to be able to devise more intelligent ways of preparing his monks for such a situation. Unlike the quite reasonable queries made by the heterodox wanderers, the four principles to be employed by the Buddhist monks do not seem to be particularly convincing assertions.[n.44] [46] Manné 1996: 21 comments that "it is difficult to see how these points support the challenge, the sīhanāda, at the beginning of this sutta."

The same is also the case for the claim that these four principles are intended to defend. In fact this is the lion's roar found in all versions, although the Ekottarika-āgama account differs in that it has this lion's roar only at its conclusion. In the two parallel versions, the lion's roar stands already at the beginning of the discourse. According to them, the Buddha started the delivery of this particular teaching by encouraging his monks to roar a lion's roar, and the remainder of the discourse is an explanation of what the monks can base themselves on when making such a proclamation.

Besides the positioning within the discourse, the nature of the lion's roar also differs. In the Ekottarika-āgama account, the lion's roar simply affirms that, in a teaching that is based on understanding all types of clinging, the four true recluses can be found. A discourse in the Aṅguttara-nikāya clarifies that the reference to the four true recluses stands for those who have reached the four levels of awakening.[n.45] [47] AN 4.239 at AN II 238,7; cf. also the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta and its parallels, which clarify that the four types of true recluses can only be found in a teaching that involves the practice of the noble eightfold path, DN 16 at DN II 151,15, DĀ 2 at T I 25a26, T 6 at T I 187c7, T 7 at T I 204a5, and fragment 485 no. 216 Rb–c, Waldschmidt 1950: 75; cf. also Waldschmidt 1948: 230, Bareau 1971a: 104, and Kiblinger 2005: 34.

The lion's roars in the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta and the Madhyama-āgama version go further than the one in the Ekottarika-āgama discourse. After affirming the existence of the four types of true recluse in their own dispensation, according to these two versions the monks should also proclaim, as part of their lion's roar, that the dispensations of others are devoid of true recluses.[n.46] [48] MN 11 at MN I 63,29: suññā parappavādā samaṇehi aññe (Be: samaṇebhi aññehi and Se: samaṇehi aññebhi). MĀ 103 at T I 590b13: 異道一切空無沙 門梵志. Of the versions of the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta, only T 6 at T I 187c8 does not have a comparable remark. The same type of remark can also be found in AN 4.239 at AN II 238,8, SĀ 979 at T II 254b12, and SĀ2 110 at T II 413c11.

The Ekottarika-āgama version of the lion's roar does not have the somewhat derogatory remark found in the parallel versions, in spite of the fact that in its account the occasion for the lion's roar is an actual encounter with and a challenge by others. In contrast, in the two parallel versions the adversaries are only imagined.

Moreover, in the Ekottarika-āgama discourse the lion's roar comes as a natural climax at the end of the discourse, whereas its positioning at the beginning of the other versions conveys a considerably more provocative impression. In sum, the lion's roar in the Ekottarika-āgama breathes a considerably less competitive spirit than its counterparts.

This would better accord with the lack of competitiveness attributed in other discourses to the Buddha.[n.47] [49] As Freiberger 2000b: 5 points out, to declare that the teachings of others are devoid of [true] recluses implies "that the ideal of 'what an ascetic ought to be' is realized only in the Buddhist saṅgha", which does seem to spring from a competitive attitude. In contrast, Wijebandara 1993: 98 notes that in general the discourses give the impression that "characteristic of the Buddha's attitude is its unpolemic nature", which he relates to the circumstance that "the Buddha did not believe that to win in argument meant one held a correct view." I already drew attention to the contrast between the lion's roars in EĀ 27.2 and its parallels in Anālayo 2005: 6f. According to a discourse in the Saṃyutta-nikāya and its parallel in the Saṃyukta-āgama, the Buddha claimed quite explicitly that he did not dispute with others, only others might dispute with him.[n.48] [50] SN 22.94 at SN III 138,26: nāhaṃ … lokena vivadāmi, loko … mayā vivadati and SĀ 37 at T II 8b16: 我不與世間諍, 世間與我諍.

For evaluating the kind of lion's roar a Buddha might teach to his disciples, a telling indication can be gathered from an injunction given in the Araṇavibhaṅga-sutta and its Madhyama-āgama parallel on the proper modes of speech to be employed when teaching. The two versions agree that one should avoid disparaging others, and instead just teach the Dharma.[n.49] [51] MN 139 at MN III 231,27 and MĀ 169 at T I 701c17. This injunction seems to stand in some degree of contrast to the type of lion's roar found in the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta and its Madhyama-āgama parallel. According to these discourses, the Buddha actually encouraged his disciples to proclaim that the dispensations of others are devoid of true recluses.

When evaluated within the context of other passages that present the Buddha or his disciples roaring a lion's roar, the lion's roars in the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta and the Madhyama-āgama discourse stand out even more for their unusual nature.

According to other discourses, when actually being defamed by others, the Buddha and Sāriputta respond by simply proclaiming what is true on their side as their lion's roar, without counterattacking. This is particularly evident in the instance in which Sāriputta is accused by one of his fellow monks of having slighted the latter. Without in any way referring to the other monk, according to the different records of this event Sāriputta simply illustrates the humble nature of his mind with various similes, making it clear that for one like him it is not possible to undertake the type of action of which he has been accused.[n.50] [52] AN 9.11 at AN IV 374,25, MĀ 24 at T I 453a4, and EĀ 37.6 at T II 713a9. The three versions agree that as a result of Sāriputta's lion's roar the other monk comes forward and asks to be forgiven for his wrong accusation. This incident reveals the power of the lion's roar in being a noncontentious but at the same time fearless proclamation of truth.

In sum, it seems that, in the case of the Cūḷasīhanāda-sutta and its Chinese parallels, the type of lion's roar found in the Ekottarika-āgama version fits better with the implications of a lion's roar reflected in other discourses. Based on an actual challenge by others, the Buddha teaches his disciples that they should respond to such a challenge by first establishing common ground with their challengers through ascertaining the nature of the final goal. Once agreement on the nature of the final goal has been reached, they should proceed to point out that progress towards this final goal requires insight into all four types of clinging. This much clarified, they can then conclude with a lion's roar that the four stages of spiritual perfection are to be found in a teaching that is based on insight into these four types of clinging.

In contrast, the Majjhima-nikāya and Madhyama-āgama versions start off with a lion's roar that has a derogatory nuance to it and then try to back this up with arguments that do not fulfil this purpose. In contrast to their presentation of the type of lion's roar a Buddha would teach his disciples, the main aspect of a lion's roar in other early Buddhist discourses appears to be a fearless proclamation of a truth in a way that is not derogatory. Its main functions are to clarify wrong allegations and to present one's position in a debate, or else to stir up a sense of urgency as a teaching method aimed at encouraging progress on the path to liberation.